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New York State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance

Company: The United States Supreme Court
Gives Commercial Insurers a Severe Case of
"The Blues"

In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co.,' the United States Supreme Court determined
that the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA) 2
did not preempt a New York statute' requiring hospitals to collect
surcharges from patients covered by commercial insurers but not from
patients insured by a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan.4 The surcharge was
part of New York's comprehensive regulatory scheme for controlling
hospital rates. 5 Patients are not charged for the cost of their individual
treatment, but for the average cost of treating the patient's ailment, as
classified under various Diagnostic Related Groups ("DRGs").5 Patients
with coverage through Blue Cross/Blue Shield, Medicaid patients, and
Health Maintenance Organization ("HMO") participants are billed at a
hospital's DRG rate.7 Other patients, however, are billed at the
hospital's DRG rate plus a surcharge which in some instances exceeds
twenty-four percent of the applicable DRG rate.8 The statute also

1.

115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).

2.

29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 ed. & Supp. V 1995).

3. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c (McKinney 1993).
4. 115 S. Ct. at 1674.
5. Id. The rates at issue were for all in-patient care, except for services provided to
Medicare beneficiaries.
6. Id. These DRGs are adjusted for each hospital "to reflect its particular operating
costs, capital investments, bad debts, costs of charity care and the like." Id.
7. Id. (citing N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(1)(a) (McKinney 1993)).
8. Id. Patients served by commercial insurers providing in-patient hospital coverage
on an expense-incurred basis, by self-insured funds directly reimbursing hospitals, and by
certain workers' compensation, volunteer firefighters' benefit, ambulance workers' benefit,
and no-fault motor vehicle insurance funds, must be billed at the DRG rate plus a 13%
surcharge to be retained by the hospital. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(lXb). Moreover,
for the year ending March 31, 1993, hospitals were required to bill commercially insured
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subjects various -HMOs to surcharges that vary with the number of
Medicaid recipients enrolled.' Wanting to invalidate these surcharges,
several commercial insurers, acting as fiduciaries for the ERISA plans
they administer, joined with their trade associations and brought actions
against various state officials in United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York."0 The New York State Conference of
Blue Cross and Blue Shield plans, Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield
(collectively "the Blues"), and the Hospital Association of New York State
subsequently intervened as defendants." Additionally, several HMOs
and the New York State Health Maintenance Organization Conference
intervened as plaintiffs. 2 The district court then consolidated the
actions and granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding
that the effect of these surcharges on choices by ERISA plans was
enough to trigger preemption." The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed, rejecting the decision of the Third Circuit in United
Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v.Morristown Memorial
Hospital4 upholding a similar rate setting statute in New Jersey, and
endorsed a broad interpretation of ERISA's pre-emption clause. 5 The
Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict, and in a unanimous opinion reversed and remanded." The

patients for a further 11% surcharge to be turned over to the State. Id. § 2807-c(11)(i).
9. 115 S. Ct. at 1673. The surcharge on HMOs may run as high as 9% of the
aggregate monthly charges paid by an HMO for its members' in-patient hospital care. N.Y.
Pus. HEALTH LAW § 2807-c(2-a)(a) to (2-a)(e). "This charge is not an increase in the rates
to be paid by an HMO to hospitals, but a direct payment by the HMO to the State's general
fund." 115 S.Ct. at 1674.
10. 115 S.Ct. at 1675.
11. Id. at 1674.
12. Id.
13. Id. The district court found that even though the surcharges "do not directly
increase a plan's costs or [alffect the level of benefits to be offered" there could be "little
doubt that the [s]urcharges ... could ... lead ... to an increase in plan costs."

Id.

Additionally, the court found that "the entire justification for the [s]urcharges (was]
premised on that exact result." Id.
14. 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993).
15. 995 F.2d at 1179. The Second Circuit reasoned that ERISA preempted any state
law that "purposefully interfere[d] with the choices that ERISA plans make for health care
coverage." Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 719 (2d Cir. 1993). Furthermore, the
Second Circuit concluded that ERISA preempted any state law that "impose[d] a significant
economic burden on commercial insurers and HMOs," especially when the law "substantially increase[d] the cost to ERISA plans of providing beneficiaries with a given level of health
care benefits." Id. at 720-21.
16. 115 S.Ct. at 1675. On remand, the court of appeals reversed the judgment of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York in part and remanded
with instructions to enter judgment for the defendants on the issue of ERISA preemption
of the surcharge statute. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Court backed away from its tradition of broadly interpreting ERISA's
preemption clause, and held that "state laws [such as New York's] do not
bear the requisite 'connection with' ERISA plans to trigger preemption."17 The Court, therefore, has now made it clear that in general,
indirect economic effects do not "relate to" ERISA plans enough to invoke
the preemption clause unless they produce "such acute, albeit indirect,
economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to
adopt a certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its
choice of insurers." 8
Article VI of the United States Constitution provides, in part, that the
laws of the United States "shall be the supreme Law of the Land; ...
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary
notwithstanding." 9 It has been well settled, since the Supreme Court's
decision in McCulloch v. Maryland" in 1819, that any state law that
conflicts with federal law is "without effect."2' The Court has further
explained that preemption may occur either by implication, by express
provision, by a direct conflict, or when federal law has so thoroughly
occupied a legislative area that one can reasonably infer that Congress
intentionally left no room for the States to supplement it.22 However,
the Supreme Court has traditionally approached claims of preemption
with the presumption that Congress does not intend to supplant state
law.23 This has been especially true regarding those areas that have

traditionally been regulated by the states. 24 The Court has cautiously
avoided preempting state law in a state's historic police power area
unless that was the "clear and manifest purpose" of Congress.25 In a
nutshell, "'[tihe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone'" of

17. 115 S. Ct. at 1680.
18. Id. at 1683.
19. U.S. CONsT. art. VI. In its past decisions, the Court has explained that the
Supremacy Clause may allow preemption of state law by express provision, implication,
or a conflict between federal and state law. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
20. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
21. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981).
22. See, e.g., Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &
Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977);
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
23. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981).
24. See id.
25. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504
(1992); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); Metropolitan Life Ins, Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519 (1977);
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
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preemption analysis. 6 ERISA is a comprehensive statute that subjects
27
plans providing employees with fringe benefits to federal regulation.
In short, it is designed to promote the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.2" Section 514(a) of ERISA
designates for preemption "all state laws insofar as they.., relate to
any employee benefit plan" ERISA covers.29 The basic purpose of the
preemption clause was to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in an attempt
to provide for the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
Since ERISA's enactment, courts have been called upon to
plans.
review the preemption clause a number of times.3 ' The Supreme Court
has traditionally interpreted ERISA's preemption provision very
broadly.3 2 For example, in Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 33 the Court
had to determine whether ERISA preempted New York's Human Rights
Laws and the State's Disability Benefits Laws. 4 True to form, the
Court endorsed a broad interpretation of ERISAs preemption clause and
explained that a state law relates to an ERISA governed plan, within the
meaning of section 514's reach, "if it has a connection with or reference
to such a plan." 5 Furthermore, the Court declared that the phrase

26. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963)).

27. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983). An employee welfare-benefit plan
or welfare plan is defined as one that provides to employees "medical, surgical, or hospital
care or benefits, .

. ."

whether these benefits are provided "through the purchase of

insurance or otherwise." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1).
28. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 90. It does not, however, require employers to provide specific
benefits, or by itself proscribe discrimination in the provision of employee benefits. Id.
29. 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
30. Id. at 1677-78.
31. District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992); FMC Corp.
v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990);
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85
(1983); United Wire, Metal & Machine Health & Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993); Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984).
32. See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1885); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
33. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
34. Id. at 88. The Human Rights Law, N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301 (McKinney 1982 &
Supp. 1982-1983), is a comprehensive anti-discrimination statute that prohibits a number
of things, including discrimination in employment on the basis of sex. The Disability
Benefits Law, N.Y. WORK. COMP. LAW §§ 200-242 (McKinney 1965 & Supp. 1982-1983),
requires employers to pay specific benefits to employees who are unable to work due to
nonoccupational injuries or illness.
35. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 97 (1983).
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"relates to" in section 514(a) is used "in the normal sense of the
phrase."3" The Court even cited the definition of "relate" in Black's
Law Dictionary.37 In Shaw, the Court did note, however, that "[slome
state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous, remote,
or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law 'relates to' the
plan."' However, a state law may be preempted even though it has no
direct nexus with ERISA plans, if its effect is to dictate or restrict the
choices of ERISA plans with regard to their benefits, structure, reporting
and administration, or if allowing states to have such rules would impair
the ability of a plan to function simultaneously in a number of states.3 9
Most notably, in United, the Third Circuit held that New Jersey's
hospital rate setting statute, which is similar to New York's, did not
relate to the plans in a way that would trigger ERISA's preemption
clause.40 The Third Circuit observed that a law relates to an ERISA
plan if it is specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans, if it
singles out such plans for special treatment, or if the rights or restrictions it creates are predicated on the existence of such a plan.4 1 In
United, however, the Third Circuit was dealing with a statute of general
application that was engineered to establish the prices to be paid for
hospital services, which did not single out ERISA plans, and that
functioned without regard to the existence of such plans.42 The Third
Circuit held, therefore, that section 514 was not intended to frustrate the
efforts of a state, using its police power, to regulate health care costs.43
The Supreme Court embraced this approach."
In reaching its unanimous decision, the Supreme Court followed
principles of dynamic statutory interpretation.' The Court began its
attempt to determine Congress's intent by examining the text of the

36. Id. at 97.
37. Id. at 97 n.16.
38. Id. at 100 n.21.
39. See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
40. 995 F.2d 1179, 1196, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993). The statutory and
regulatory regime at issue in this case can be found in the New Jersey Health Care
Facilities Planning Act of 1971, as amended by the Health Care Cost Reduction Act of
1978, N.J. STAT. ANN. 26:2H-1 to 26:2H-26 (West 1996) and the relevant regulations, N.J.
ADMIN. CODE 8:31B (1990).
41. 995 F.2d at 1192; see also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486
U.S. 825 (1988); Bricklayers Local 33 v. America's Marble Source, 950 F.2d 114 (3d Cir.
1991); McMahon v. McDowell, 794 F.2d 100 (3d Cir. 1986).
42. 995 F.2d at 1192.
43. Id. at 1196.
44. 115 S.Ct. at 1683.
45. For an explanation of dynamic statutory interpretation, see Eskridge, Dynamic
Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
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preemption provision."' More specifically, the Court analyzed that
portion that says, "all state laws insofar as they ... relate to any
employee benefit plan" covered by ERISA.47 The Court first noted that
this portion of the text of section 514(a) was expansive, 48 so expansive
in fact that if taken literally, the words of limitation would not do much
limiting.4' The Court concluded that such a reading would result in
Congress's words of limitation being nothing more than a mere sham,
reading the presumption against preemption out of the law whenever
Congress speaks to the matter with generality.50 The Court then
conceded that previous attempts to construe the phrase "relate to" did
not provide much assistance in this case. 5' The Court then turned to
its decision in Shaw, in which it interpreted the preemption clause very
broadly.52 The Court explained that "[a] law 'relates to' an employee
benefit plan, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."'
The Court immediately ruled out the latter alternative because the
surcharges are imposed on patients regardless of whether an ERISA
plan ultimately secures their insurance coverage; therefore, the statutes
54
could not be said to make "reference to" ERISA plans in any manner.
Still left with the question of whether the surcharge statutes had a
"connection with" the ERISA plans, the Court stated that just as infinite
relations could not form the basis for preemption, neither could infinite
connections.55 The Court, therefore, had to move beyond the text of
section 514(a) and look to the objectives of ERISA to determine the scope
of state laws that Congress intended to survive.5 6 After examining past
decisions and a statement by the sponsor of the Act, the Court concluded
that the basic thrust of the preemption clause was to avoid a multiplicity
of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration
of employee benefit plans.57 The Court then reasoned that while there

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

115 S. Ct. at 1677.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

51. Id.
52. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
53. Id. at 96-97.
54. 115 S. Ct. at 1677. Cf District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S.
125 (1992) (striking down a District of Columbia law that "specifically refers to welfare

benefit plans regulated by ERISA and on that basis alone is pre-empted").
55, 115 S. Ct. at 1677.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1677-78. In a previous decision, the Court had already found that in passing

§ 514(a), Congress intended:
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was no evidence that New York's surcharges would drive each and every
health insurance consumer to the Blues, they nonetheless make the
Blues more attractive as insurance alternatives, and result in an indirect
economic effect on choices insurance buyers make-including ERISA
plans."8 The Court concluded, however, that an indirect economic
influence does not bind plan administrators to any particular plan and
therefore does not function as a regulation of an ERISA plan.5"
Moreover, the Court concluded that the indirect influence of the
surcharges would not preclude uniform administrative practice or the
provision of a uniform interstate benefit package, if a plan wished to
provide one. 60 The Court thought that if it were to read the preemption
provision as uprooting all state laws affecting hospital costs and charges
on the supposition that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans, it would
in essence be reading the limiting language in section 514(a) out of the
statute. Such a result would violate the basic principles of statutory
interpretation and would not be in accord with the Court's prior
pronouncement that "[pIreemption does not occur ...if the state law has
only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral connection with covered plans, as
is the case with many laws of general applicability."6 1 The Court
further noted that even though Congress's extention of preemption to all
"state laws relating to benefit plans" was meant to be broader than
"state laws dealing with the subject matters covered by ERISA-reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility, and the like,"6 2 there was
nothing in either the language of the Act or the context of its passage to
indicate that Congress chose to preempt general health care regulation,
which has historically been a matter of local concern. 3 The Court
therefore came to the conclusion that surcharge statutes such as New

to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of
complying with conflicting directives among States or between States and the
Federal Government .... [and to prevent] the potential for conflict in substantive
law.., requiring the tailoring of plans and employer conduct to the peculiarities
of the law of each jurisdiction.
Id. at 1677 (quoting Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)). This
conclusion was further confirmed by a statement of Representative Dent, a sponsor of the
Act, that the objective was to "eliminat[e] the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State
and local regulation." 120 CONG. REC. 29197 (1974).
58. 115 S.Ct. at 1679.
59. Id.
60. Id,
61. Id. at 1679-80 (quoting District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506
U.S. 125, 129 n.1 (1992)).
62. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 & n.19.
63. 115 S.Ct. at 1680.
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York's do not bear the requisite connection with ERISA plans to trigger
preemption.64 The Court intentionally avoided addressing the thirteen
percent surcharge statute insofar as it applied to self-insured funds and
left the issue for consideration on remand.65
This decision appears to signal that the Court is retreating from its
past practice of broadly interpretating ERISA's preemption clause. This
past practice led many to believe that Travelers would be decided
differently, and that New York's statute would indeed be preempted.
The Court made it clear, however, that in general, indirect economic
effects do not relate to ERISA plans enough to invoke the preemption
clause.66 The Court stressed, however, that its ruling does not limit
ERISA preemption only to direct regulation of ERISA plans and that
there may be instances where an indirect effect may trigger preemption.6 7 Exactly at what point an indirect economic effect significantly
impacts a plan to trigger preemption is not yet known. Furthermore,
the Court left a loophole for self-insured funds." On remand, however,
the Second Circuit closed the loophole for that circuit by ruling that if
a regulation did not relate to a non-self-insured plan it would not relate
to a self-insured plan either.6" Many have seen ERISA preemption as
70
a major obstacle to state efforts to control spiraling health care costs.

One has to wonder if the increased national attention that the media
and others have placed on health care in recent years was the real
impetus behind the Court's dramatic move. Through this opinion,
however, the Supreme Court has not only resolved the conflict between
the Second and Third Circuits on this issue, it has given other states the
green light to implement similar rate setting programs. Whether other
states will follow New York's lead, however, is a different issue;
although, some states eagerly awaited this decision. For example,
Connecticut imposed a tax on hospitals' gross receipts that was then
used to reimburse the hospitals for the costs of their uncompensated
care.71 In Connecticut Hospital Ass'n v. Pogue,72 a federal judge relied
64. Id.

65. Id. at 1675 n.4.
66. Id. at 1683.
67. See id. The Court acknowledged "that a state law might produce such acute, albeit
indirect, economic effects, by intent or otherwise, as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a
certain scheme of substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that
such a state law might indeed be shown to be pre-empted under [section] 514." Id.
68. 115 S. Ct. at 1675 no4.
69. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 1995).
70. Michael S. Gordon, Managed Care,ERISA Pre.emption, and Health Reform-The
Current Outlook, 4 BHLR 16 d44 (1995).
71. 1994 Conn. Acts 94-9 (Reg. Sess.).
72. 870 F. Supp. 444 (D. Conn. 1994).
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on the Second Circuit's decision in this case and struck down the tax and
reimbursement plan, saying that ERISA preempted the plan.73
Similarly, in New England Health Care Employees Union District 1199
v. Mount Sinai Hospital,"' a federal judge found ERISA to preempt a
prior Connecticut uncompensated care arrangement.7 5 In light of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Travelers, the Second Circuit reversed both
decisions on appeal.7" The effect that Travelers will ultimately have on
the nation's health care costs remains to be seen. While rate setting
statutes may be intended to control the overall costs of healthcare, they
inarguably have a negative effect on commercial insurers, or at least
their subscribers who ultimately pay the price through increased
premiums. Through rate setting statutes, states can force commercial
insurers, and thus their subscribers, to subsidize the health care
expenses of others. Unfortunately, though, if this form of crosssubsidation was not taken advantage of, the funds for uncompensated
care would have to come from another source, such as taxes. The bottom
line of Travelers, however, is that the Supreme Court has strengthened
states' ability to regulate hospital rates. As long as the regulation simply
affects "a plan's shopping decisions" and does "not bind plan administrators to any particular choice," Travelers would seem to say that it should
not be preempted.77 Therefore, under Travelers, states may indeed
create rate differentials that influence such choices.7"
MARK A. WILLIAMS

73. Id. at 444.
74. 846 F. Supp. 190 (D. Conn. 1994).
75. Id. at 190.
76. See New England Health Care Employees Union v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 65 F.3d
1024 (2d Cir. 1995); and Community Hosp. Assoc. v. Weltman, 66 F.3d 413 (2d Cir. 1995).
77. 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
78. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Pataki, 63 F.3d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1995).

